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AFTER NATWEST: HOW COURTS SHOULD HANDLE 
OECD COMMENTARY IN DOUBLE TAXATION 
TREATY INTERPRETATIONS 
Brian Caster* 
Rufus T. Firefly: Awfully decent of you to drop in today.  Do you realize 
our army is facing disastrous defeat?  What do you intend to do 
about it? 
Chicolini: I’ve done it already. 
Rufus T. Firefly: You’ve done what? 
Chicolini: I’ve changed to the other side. 
Rufus T. Firefly: So you’re on the other side, eh?  Well, what are you 
doing over here? 
Chicolini: Well, the food is better over here.†  
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INTRODUCTION 
National Westminster Bank, PLC (NatWest), a British bank that once 
had six U.S. branches, sought to dramatically decrease its tax burden within 
the United States between 1981 and 1987.  The reason was obvious: al-
though the U.S. market is very lucrative, hosting a large number of foreign 
bank branches and subsidiaries, the U.S. corporate tax rates for foreign cor-
porations are very high compared to those of other countries.1  For a period 
of eight years, NatWest shifted much of its U.S. branches’ profits as “loan 
repayments” to its branches in Hong Kong, which had a significantly lower 
tax rate, thus decreasing its taxable income on the U.S. branches’ books 
through interest deductions.2  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses 
these books to determine what amount of capital the branch utilized in con-
nection with its operations, which it then uses to assess that branch’s annual 
tax debt.3  When the IRS discovered that NatWest’s U.S. branches were 
“borrowing” money from NatWest’s Hong Kong branches and the U.K. 
home office, while taking an interest expense deduction for on-the-book in-
terest “payments,”4 it ordered NatWest to pay taxes of over $65 million.5  
This disparity arose from NatWest’s calculation of its interest expense, 
which the IRS disputed.6  After recalculating, the IRS found NatWest had 
an additional $155 million in taxable income for the years 1981 to 1987.7  
When the United Kingdom then offered NatWest only a partial foreign tax 
credit to cover a portion of the assessed debt, NatWest instead opted to pay 
the additional taxes and sue the IRS to recover the full amount of the IRS 
reassessment.8  After numerous suits and a final appeal to the Federal Cir-
cuit, NatWest received its tax refund.9   
 
1  The U.S. corporate tax rate is on a sliding scale, but for the largest corporations, it can reach 35%.  
See John D. McKinnon, No Holiday on Tax Day, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/04/18/no-holiday-on-tax-day (noting that the U.S. corporate tax rate, 
which can reach 35%, is “among the world’s highest”).  By comparison, the corporate tax rate in Hong 
Kong is currently 16.5%.  See INLAND REVENUE DEP’T, GOV’T OF THE H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, 
A BRIEF GUIDE TO TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 2010–2011, at 1–2 
(2010) [hereinafter INLAND REVENUE DEP’T TAX GUIDE], available at http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/
tax_guide_e.pdf. 
2  See David Cay Johnston, British Bank Wins Dispute with the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1999, at 
C1. 
3  See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d) (as amended in 2010).   
4  Johnston, supra note 2; see also Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest I), 
44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121–22 (1999) (referring to NatWest’s intracorporate loans and payments in 
quotations).   
5  See Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest IV), 512 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
6  Id. 
7  Id. at 1349–50. 
8  Id. at 1350.  Countries often give tax credits to domestic taxpayers with international operations as 
a means to offset any double taxation.  See I.R.C. § 904 (2006); see also id. § 1(h)(11)(C) (placing a 
limitation on foreign tax credit for dividends taxed as net capital gain).  Each country determines what 
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The courts that presided over these suits all relied on the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports and guides 
available in 1975, when the United Kingdom and the United States signed 
their treaty on double taxation.10  The courts refused to give anything more 
than “minimal deference” to official OECD commentary available after that 
date.11  But if courts intend to use these guides and reports as persuasive au-
thority, they should look to subsequent reports and guides that address is-
sues that could not have been foreseen at the time of ratification and give 
those materials a level of deference similar that given to materials available 
at the time of ratification.  This was where NatWest courts went wrong: if 
they had looked to recent OECD commentary, they would have seen that 
the OECD addressed the issue in favor of the IRS’s interpretation. 
When banks create permanent establishments (PEs) like branches or 
subsidiaries within other countries, they sculpt their tax planning according 
to the terms provided in a treaty between their home country and the coun-
try of establishment.  These treaties aim to prevent the double taxation of 
the income of a single company.12  Double taxation takes place when two 
countries, specifically a party’s home country and another country, tax the 
same income.  Although some scholars maintain that the fear of double tax-
ation is unfounded,13 avoiding it has nonetheless become a core purpose of 
tax legislation.  Such concerns motivated the OECD to create a model con-
vention for the avoidance of double taxation (Model Treaty).14  The OECD 
                                                                                                                           
international income taxes it will offset, see, e.g., § 882(c)(3) (providing where limitations exist on 
foreign tax credits in the United States), and as in the case of NatWest, the amount offset does not often 
equal a total offset of international income taxes.  See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1350 (discussing how 
NatWest concluded it would be liable for $37 million in tax liability without a corresponding tax credit 
in the United Kingdom). 
9  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1351–52. 
10  Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.–U.K., Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668 [hereinafter 
U.S.–U.K. Treaty].  This Comment will not discuss the court’s failure to differentiate between the date 
that a treaty is signed and the date that the treaty is actually ratified.  However, this distinction is 
important, since a signed treaty can have no effect until the Senate ratifies it, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2, and thus any reports or commentary available before it is ratified could arguably influence the 
language of the treaty.   
11  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1358–59. 
12  For example, the treaty at issue in the NatWest litigation between the United States and the 
United Kingdom provides in its preamble that it is meant to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal 
evasion of taxes.  U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10, at pmbl.   
13  See, e.g., Herwig J. Schlunk, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxation, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 150–56 (2003) (showing that a double income tax regime can be 
equivalent to a single nation’s income tax regime). 
14  The Model Treaty is itself called the Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital.  
DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & 
Dev. 1963) (updated 2010) [hereinafter MODEL TREATY], in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
REPORT OF THE OECD FISCAL COMMITTEE (1963) [hereinafter MODEL TREATY REPORT]. 
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frequently updates the Model Treaty language,15 and it also releases reports, 
guides, and commentary that address potential conflicts that countries face 
when interpreting the language of the Model Treaty.16  A number of coun-
tries adopted the language of the Model Treaty, in whole or in part, when 
ratifying and adopting their own treaties to prevent double taxation.17  These 
include the United States and the United Kingdom, who based their double 
taxation treaty on the Model Treaty language.18   
The U.S. tax system has responded to the idea of the time value of 
money: taxpayers want to pay as little tax as possible now (if ever), and the 
government wants as much tax as possible paid now rather than later.19  
Corporate entities share this motivation.  Obviously, NatWest hoped to pay 
as little tax as possible, and it hoped to do so by circumventing the system 
put in place by the IRS.  When its actions were challenged, NatWest sought 
protection from the courts and received it.  
The Federal Circuit upheld NatWest’s actions as consistent with the 
United States–United Kingdom Treaty on the Prevention of Double Taxa-
tion (U.S.–U.K. Treaty),20 affirming three lower court decisions that 
spanned a ten-year period.  In the first decision, NatWest I,21 the Court of 
Federal Claims determined that the Treasury regulation the IRS applied to 
calculate NatWest’s attributed profits22 violated the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.23  
Four years later, in NatWest II, the court analyzed a new calculation the IRS 
proposed to tax the bank.24  But it found that this calculation also violated 
the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.25  The Federal Circuit affirmed these decisions, as 
 
15  Its most recent update took place in July 2010.  See OECD Approves Updates to Model Tax 
Convention, Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (July 22, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/
document/20/0,3343,en_2649_37989746_45689428_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
16  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2010 REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF 
PROFITS TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS (2010). 
17  Many U.S. tax treaties with other countries include language practically identical to that of the 
Model Treaty.  Compare United States Income Tax Treaties—A to Z, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/international/article/0,,id=96739,00.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2011), with MODEL TREATY, 
supra note 14 (containing similar structure and language). 
18  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The ‘entire context’ of the 1975 Treaty is 
informed by, and is based on, the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (‘OECD’) 1963 
Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital . . . .”).  
19  See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Contingent Payments and the Time Value of Money, 40 TAX LAW. 
237, 237 (1987) (“Present value concepts invaded the federal income tax law in the early Eighties, when 
both practitioners and policymakers recognized the importance of the time value of money in 
determining tax burdens.”). 
20  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1349. 
21  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999). 
22  Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980).  The Treasury regulation determined the allocable amount of 
profits to each branch of a foreign bank.  See infra Part I.D for a full explanation of this regulation. 
23  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 121.  
24  Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest II), 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 492 (2003). 
25  Id. at 497–99. 
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well as that in NatWest III, but the issue in that case—including whether 
NatWest could treat its six U.S. branches as one PE for tax purposes26—is 
outside the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed in detail.   
In both NatWest I and NatWest II, the court relied on OECD commen-
tary to give meaning to the ambiguous treaty language on the proper way to 
attribute profits to PEs.  Yet their construction relied on the commentary 
and guidance available to both the United States and the United Kingdom at 
the time of ratification.27  Although this might initially appear to be a rea-
sonable interpretive strategy—focusing as it does on the ratifying parties’ 
expectations at the time of entering into the treaty28—it fails to take into ac-
count situations that neither party could anticipate at the time of ratification 
and whether future commentary was within their expectations.  The Nat-
West I court explained that the OECD drafters intended the commentary to 
be used in determining the mutual understanding of countries that created 
tax treaties based on the Model Treaty,29 referring to the Model Treaty’s 
“detailed Commentaries designed to illustrate or interpret each Article.”30  
The NatWest I court did not explain why this language should limit com-
mentary discussion to only the texts available at the time of ratification—
probably because the Model Treaty does not include such limiting lan-
guage. 
The key to understanding the courts’ error is in the operation of the 
OECD Model Treaty.  Since the inception of the Model Treaty, the OECD 
has issued commentary, reports, guides, and other tools to reach an under-
standing of the treaty language and to resolve conflicts as they arise.31  This 
Comment does not argue that courts should actually rely on OECD com-
mentary even if such reliance was the intention of the Model Treaty’s draf-
ters.  Rather, it argues that if courts choose to rely on external sources like 
commentary to solve issues with respect to the language of the Model Trea-
 
26  Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest III), 69 Fed. Cl. 128, 140–41 (2005), 
aff’d, 512 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008).     
27  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 496–503 (accepting earlier OECD commentary and rejecting later 
OECD commentary, after a brief discussion, as “not reflect[ive of] the understanding of the 1975 Treaty 
partners”); NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 125 (“The initial explanatory material of the OECD Document and 
the Commentaries . . . are important and helpful in determining the probable mutual understanding of 
countries which used the Document as the basis for a tax treaty.”).   
28  See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 503 (“[W]hile the 2003 Discussion Draft shows the continued 
thinking of the OECD on attributing capital to branches and its post-1995 evolving views on arm’s 
length principles, the 2003 Discussion Draft does not reflect the understanding of the 1975 Treaty 
partners, and is, thus, ultimately irrelevant to the court’s conclusion.”). 
29  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 125. 
30  Id. at 125 n.6 (emphasis omitted). 
31  The OECD issued new reports on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in 2008 
and 2010 along with new Model Treaty language for Article 7.  See Profits of Permanent 
Establishments: News & Events, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
newsEvents/0,3382,en_2649_37989746_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
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ty and its successor ratified treaties, they should look at more than just the 
commentary available at the time of a treaty’s ratification.   
The NatWest courts left the IRS in a tough position.  The U.S.–U.K. 
Treaty has since been altered to reflect changes in thinking about the attri-
bution of profits to PEs.32  Yet potential issues unaddressed at the time of a 
treaty’s ratification could very likely arise—in fact, we know they do arise 
because otherwise there would be no need for subsequent OECD commen-
tary.  Courts inevitably face situations in which they must decide whether to 
reach opposite decisions on the same treaty language because differing 
commentary existed at the differing times of ratification.  This Comment 
proposes a method for dealing with treaties based on the OECD Model 
Treaty: as a matter of consistency, the IRS and any courts interpreting IRS 
determinations should look to the entirety of the OECD commentary rather 
than treating the Model Treaty as a static concept at the time two countries 
adopt its language in their own double taxation treaty.   
Part I discusses the role of foreign banks in the United States and how 
they are taxed.  Part II analyzes the NatWest litigation, including the lower 
court decisions and the appellate court affirmation of those decisions.  Part 
III focuses on the role of the OECD material in litigation.  Part IV proposes 
a new way for courts to use OECD commentary when interpreting double 
taxation treaties.  Applying this method, Part IV concludes that the corpo-
rate yardstick method would be the best means of assessing a PE’s taxable 
income.   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Foreign Banks in the United States 
Foreign banks maintain a substantial presence in the United States.  
Total banking assets in the United States of foreign-related banking institu-
tions exceed $1.98 trillion, and total nonbanking assets are approximately 
$2.58 trillion.33  Foreign banks have numerous reasons to enter the U.S. 
market, from a desire to provide financial services to corporate clients that 
have expanded into the United States to the simple fact that the United 
States is “a significant force in international trade,” and thus many interna-
tional transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars.34  There are several 
ways banks can enter the U.S. marketplace.  This Comment focuses on two: 
the branch and subsidiary forms. 
 
32  See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.–U.K., July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161 
[hereinafter 2001 U.S.–U.K. Treaty]. 
33  RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF 
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 740 (4th ed. 2009). 
34  RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 25 (1994). 
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1. Differences Between Branch and Subsidiary Form.—Under the In-
ternational Banking Act of 1978 (IBA), Congress attempted to regulate PEs 
of foreign banks.35  The IBA permitted foreign banks to create a PE in a 
number of ways, including via a branch or subsidiary.36   
The term “branch” is defined as “any office or any place of busi-
ness . . . at which deposits are received.”37  Branches have broad authority to 
conduct many types of banking business, such as making loans, issuing let-
ters of credit, and brokering securities.38  The IBA prescribes a pledge of as-
sets as a minimum requirement to open a branch in the United States,39 and 
it sets five percent of liabilities as a default.40  But a branch is not separately 
capitalized, and it has “no assets that are independent of the foreign bank 
parent.”41  In other words, the bank’s home office must pledge a certain 
amount of assets, but the branch form does not require that the U.S. branch 
itself maintain any of this capital; instead, the capital can remain with the 
home office.  This gives banks the ability to maintain their bank in the 
United States without needing to maintain large amounts of capital in that 
branch.  Attempting to make the U.S. banking market a leveler playing 
field,42 the IBA provided foreign-related banks a regulated method of open-
ing U.S. branches, which put them in roughly equal competitive positions 
with domestic bank branches.43   
A foreign bank can also create a bank in the form of a subsidiary.  Sub-
sidiaries are similar to branches, except they are independently capitalized 
and incorporated under state law.44  There are two ways that a foreign bank 
can establish a subsidiary: it can acquire an existing U.S. bank, or it can 
form a new subsidiary bank de novo.45  Subsidiaries are separately capita-
lized and subject to state and federal regulations.46   
 
35  12 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3111 (2006). 
36  CARL FELSENFELD, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION 20–21 (2d ed. 2007); see § 3101(3), 
(7). 
37  § 3101(3).   
38  FELSENFELD, supra note 36, at 21. 
39  § 3102(g)(1). 
40  Id. § 3102(g)(2). 
41  BHALA, supra note 34, at 28. 
42  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-910, at 5 (1978) (“The second objective [of the IBA] is to provide to the 
extent possible or appropriate equal treatment for foreign and domestic banks operating in the United 
States.”). 
43  Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Context, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990S, at 3, 13–14 (J.J. Norton et al. eds., 
1994).   
44  BHALA, supra note 34, at 27. 
45  Id. 
46  Id.  
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Historically, most foreign banks in the United States have chosen to 
operate in branch form rather than through a subsidiary.47  The branch form 
presents certain tax-related and non-tax-related advantages over the subsidi-
ary form.  The branch form prevents the branch from being subject to any 
federal or state lending limitations because the branch’s capital is still under 
the control of the head office.48  A U.S. subsidiary of a foreign bank, on the 
other hand, “must be newly capitalized at the time of its formation.”49  Fur-
ther, when a subsidiary repays its home office for any capitalization pro-
vided, the return payment in the form of interest or dividends may be 
subject to taxation that is not offset with any tax credits from the home 
country.50  Finally, foreign bank branches are not required to obtain federal 
deposit insurance so long as they restrict their deposit operations to foreign 
activities and do not accept deposits of below $100,000.51   
2. Double Taxation Treaties and Bank Branches.—Double taxation 
treaties seek to eliminate a potential circular transaction: First, a foreign 
bank with a U.S. branch is subject to income tax in its home country on its 
entire worldwide income.  Then, the foreign bank is subject to income tax 
in the United States for its branch.  Finally, the foreign bank’s home coun-
try provides it with tax credits to offset the amount paid to the United 
States.  Such circular transactions can often occur in the banking context, 
especially with deductions for interest expenses.  Countries implement 
double taxation treaties in their tax policies to minimize this type of transac-
tion. 
There are, generally speaking, two regimes under which the IRS can 
tax the income of foreign banks in the United States.  The IRS first deter-
mines whether the income is actually connected to the U.S. branch.  If so, 
the IRS taxes that income as it would any income of a domestic corpora-
tion.52  When the IRS determines the income is not sufficiently connected to 
the activities of the U.S. branch, it then seeks to determine the source of the 
income.53  Unconnected income consisting of interest yields a thirty percent 
tax rate—although double taxation treaties almost always preempt this.54 
 
47  Alfred C. Groff & James F. Hoch, Selected Issues in U.S. Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign 
Banks, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 343, 343.  Because the SEC rules do not apply to branches and because 
branches are themselves merely an “extension” of the head office, the head office will be responsible for 
any monetary issues that arise.  A subsidiary is a separately incorporated institution within the United 
States, though, so its funds are distinct from its head office’s. 
48  Id. at 344. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 33, at 742. 
52  Groff & Hoch, supra note 47, at 344–47. 
53  Id. 
54  See id.  The United States has such treaties with, for example, the Netherlands, Convention for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, U.S.–Neth., Dec. 18, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-6; Austria, Convention for the Avoidance 
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Most treaties explicitly provide that interest in the parent–branch con-
text is not subject to taxation in the foreign country.  If, for example, two 
countries each have a bank that has one foreign branch in the other country, 
their treaty would provide that interest on loans between the branch and 
parent is nontaxable.  Otherwise, each of the banks would pay tax on the in-
terest and then would receive compensation from their home country in the 
form of a foreign tax credit.  The end result would be the governments of 
each country collecting the same (or, at least, a similar) amount of tax and 
then giving out that same amount of money to the bank in the form of a for-
eign tax credit. 
Double taxation treaties do not always cover the entirety of interest ex-
pense.  Where they do not, a branch has an incentive to treat the income as 
effectively connected.  Foreign banks operating in the United States can de-
duct this additional interest expense from their effectively connected in-
come—in other words, from their taxable income.55  So when a double taxa-
taxation treaty does not deflect all taxes on a branch’s interest expense, the 
branch would desire it to be effectively connected—and thus deductible on 
another front.   
B. The OECD 
When the United States and the United Kingdom entered into a treaty 
for the avoidance of double taxation, both parties relied on the Model Trea-
ty Convention of the OECD.  The OECD56 formed in 1961 to help its mem-
ber countries achieve sustainable economic growth.57  Thirty countries are 
member nations of the OECD, including both the United States and the 
United Kingdom.58  Although the OECD lacks formal lawmaking powers, it 
does issue reports, recommendations, and analyses on which member na-
tions may rely when determining international monetary policy.59  This 
commentary was intended to “be of great assistance in the application of the 
Conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of eventual disputes.”60 
                                                                                                                           
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–
Austria, May 31, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-31; and the United Kingdom, 2001 U.S.–U.K. Treaty, 
supra note 32.  
55  Groff & Hoch, supra note 47, at 346. 
56  A number of terms used by the OECD, including the term “Organization” in its name, are spelled 
in British English with an “s” instead of a “z.”  Due to the NatWest courts’ reliance on the “z” spelling 
of these terms, this Comment will employ all of the “z” spellings. 
57  See History, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_
36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
58  For a complete list of all member nations and partner nations of the OECD, see Members and 
Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_
36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
59  FELSENFELD, supra note 36, at 272.   
60  MODEL TREATY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18.   
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The prospect of double taxation is a major concern for the OECD be-
cause it has the potential to stifle global expansion and burden member 
countries.61  Double taxation of the combined economic profits of related 
corporations can occur “whenever countries use different allocation me-
thods or use the same method but produce different transfer prices or differ-
ent profits allocable to the corporations.”62  Such concerns gave rise to 
international efforts to develop a common allocation norm.63   
In 1963, the OECD developed the Model Treaty.64  Its drafters at-
tempted to guide member nations on how to format treaties between each 
other both to ensure that each country received its due taxes and to prevent 
 
61  See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income 
Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1767–69 (1999) (discussing the American corporate 
“double” taxation system and its potential to stifle growth within the United States). 
62  Brian D. Lepard, Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right? A Multidisciplinary 
Inquiry into the Normative Authority of Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’s Length 
Standard as a Case Study, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 43, 52 (1999).  The IRS relies on two methods 
to determine interest expense: formulary apportionment and separate accounting.  When countries differ 
in their method of accounting, it can result in large tax windfalls or steep tax burdens for different 
international companies, depending on the countries in which they operate PEs.   
The separate accounting method treats the parent and the PE as operating completely separate 
businesses in completely different settings.  For example, imagine a Japanese car manufacturer with a 
PE located in Bulgaria, where corporate tax is very low.  Now imagine that the car manufacturer 
produces a car for $5000 in Japan with a retail price of $25,000 in foreign markets.  Under the separate 
accounting principle, the Japanese parent has an incentive to sell each car to its foreign PEs for as close 
to $5000 as possible, leaving little taxable profit in the Japanese parent and shifting most of the profit to 
the Bulgarian PE, where it will be taxed at the country’s low tax rate.   
The formulary apportionment method treats the parent and PE as operating a single business of 
manufacturing and selling cars.  Their combined income per car would be $20,000 (retail price less 
manufacturing costs).  Now assume that the formula takes into account only payroll.  If the Japanese 
parent and Bulgarian PE have payrolls of $900,000 and $100,000, respectively, then 90% ($900,000 ÷ 
$1,000,000) of the combined income of $20,000 per car (that is, $18,000) would be allocated to the 
Japanese parent.  The remaining 10% of combined income ($2000) would be allocated to the Bulgarian 
PE for taxation purposes. 
From these examples, it becomes clear why two countries with opposite accounting methods could 
create both positive and negative consequences for different multinational companies.  Consider, for 
example, that the Japanese parent sells cars to its Bulgaria PE for $5,000.  If Japan’s government then 
decides to apply a formulary apportionment method and Bulgaria’s government sticks with the separate 
accounting method, the result would be $18,000 of double taxation.  Japan’s formulary apportionment 
method would attribute $18,000 of that car’s profits to the Japanese parent, and Bulgaria would tax the 
PE to the tune of $20,000 for its separate allocation.  The result is tax on $38,000 despite an actual profit 
of only $20,000. 
If Japan were to apply a separate accounting method and Bulgaria a formulary apportionment 
method, the opposite would happen: a tax windfall to the car manufacturer.  The Japanese parent would 
have no taxable profit (because it sold the car for the $5000 it cost to manufacture), and the Bulgarian 
PE would have $2000 of taxable income (its apportioned profit in the above example) taxed at 
Bulgaria’s far lower corporate rate. 
These examples are adapted from several examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(6) (as amended in 
1996). 
63  Lepard, supra note 62, at 52. 
64  MODEL TREATY, supra note 14. 
105:1317  (2011) After NatWest: Double Taxation Treaty Interpretation 
 1327
double taxation of multinational corporations.65  As noted above, if every 
country maintained the same accounting method and operated under the 
same treaty, there would theoretically be no opportunity for double taxation 
or tax windfalls.  Although not binding on any member nations, the Model 
Treaty proved influential when member nations drafted their own treaties 
for the purposes of avoiding double taxation.66  
Article 7 of the Model Treaty contains the language pertinent to the at-
tribution of profits to a PE.  Of particular relevance is Article 7(2): 
Where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated [t]herein, there 
shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment 
the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is 
a permanent establishment.67 
Under the Model Treaty, the branch of a foreign corporation is to be treated 
as if it were “distinct and separate,” dealing “wholly independently” with its 
head office.  This language proved the most contentious: what, after all, 
does it mean to operate distinctly from a parent company?  The PE filing 
taxes must replicate this tax fiction because branches necessarily deal with 
their parents.  A branch could look to its books and those of its parent to es-
tablish its independent operations.  But as the NatWest I court noted when 
referring to Article 7’s commentary, the business records and the facts as 
they appear therein should be adjusted when the actual facts are different.68   
A further problem with interpreting the “distinct and separate” lan-
guage is that, when a PE receives funds from its parent company, adjust-
ments must be made for tax purposes so that these transactions appear to be 
at “arm’s length” rates.69  “Arm’s length” looks to whether the parent com-
pany would have entered into the same transaction with an actually inde-
pendent, similarly situated entity; if not, it then asks what the actual rate 
would have been.70  For example, if NatWest loaned money to its subsidiar-
ies at a lower interest rate, “arm’s length” would ask what interest rate 
NatWest would have offered the branch of another bank.  Such adjustments 
 
65  See MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 7–9 (Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 MODEL TREATY], available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/28/0,3746,en_2649_33747_41231132_1_1_1_1,00.html.  The 2008 version, unlike the 1963 
Model Treaty, lays out the historical background that led to its formation.  Id.  It recognized the growing 
interdependence of the member nations and the increasing need to implement measures to prevent 
international double taxation.   
66  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
67  MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 45–46, art. 7, para. 2. 
68  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 126 (2009) (citing MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82–83). 
69  See MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82–83, art. 7, cmts. 11–12. 
70  See id. at 82, art. 7, cmt. 12 (“[I]t will usually be appropriate to substitute for the prices used 
ordinary market prices for the same or similar goods supplied on the same or similar conditions.”). 
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are necessary to reflect the economic reality that PEs are not actually inde-
pendent and distinct.  There are limitations to this approach.  NatWest is a 
good example why: its PEs could rely on its strong credit rating to secure 
loans that actually independent branches could not, and for tax purposes, no 
adjustment is made for this distinction.  Although flawed, this approach best 
replicates the economic reality of how PEs operate.  Tellingly, it was the 
IRS’s measuring the NatWest branches via “similarly situated” branches 
that the NatWest II court rejected.71 
C. The U.S.–U.K. Treaty 
The United States and the United Kingdom first entered into a treaty 
on the prevention of double taxation on December 31, 1975.72  Both coun-
tries relied heavily on the Model Treaty, and large portions of the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty repeat the Model Treaty language verbatim.  The language of 
both treaties’ Article 7(2) is practically identical.73  The language of Article 
7(3) diverges only slightly between the two.  For example, the Model Trea-
ty describes “purposes of the permanent establishment” as including “ex-
ecutive and general administrative expenses so incurred.”74  Yet the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty goes into greater depth as to which of these executive and gen-
eral administrative expenses are deductible, elaborating on the various costs 
that go into operating a PE.75   
Article 3 of both the Model Treaty and the U.S.–U.K. Treaty allows for 
the domestic law of the country to determine the meaning of any terms left 
undefined.76  Because the U.S.–U.K. Treaty does not define the phrase “rea-
sonable allocation,” each of the countries applies its own domestic law to 
give meaning to this term. 
D. Evolution of the Taxing Regime in the United States 
In 1980, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued Regulation 1.882-
5 in its current form, which governs the apportionment of the interest ex-
pense of foreign corporations engaged in business in the United States.77  
The Regulation begins by explicitly disregarding loans and credit transac-
 
71  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 502 (2003) (discussing the 2001 Discussion Draft). 
72  The U.S.–U.K Treaty took effect on April 25, 1980.  U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10. 
73  Compare id. art. 7(2), with MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 45–46, art. 7, para. 2 (containing 
only two minor differences, one a substitution of “therein” for “herein” and the other an explicit 
reference to the provisions Article 7(3)).   
74  MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 46, art. 7, para. 3. 
75  The U.S.–U.K. Treaty goes on to say,“including a reasonable allocation of executive and general 
administrative expenses, research and development expenses, interest, and other expenses incurred for 
the purposes of the enterprise as a whole (or the part thereof which includes the permanent 
establishment).”  U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(3). 
76  Id. art. 3, para. 2; MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 42, art. 3, para. 2. 
77  Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980). 
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tions among branches of the same foreign corporation.78  The Regulation 
then applies a three-step formula to determine the allowable interest deduc-
tion.79  This was particularly pertinent in the case of NatWest’s U.S. 
branches, which deducted the interest expense from “loans” they received 
from the home office and Hong Kong.80   
Under step one, “asset determination,” the IRS assesses the average to-
tal value of all assets of the branch that “generate, have generated, or could 
reasonably have been or be expected to generate income, gain, or loss effec-
tively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United 
States.”81  Except for noting that all values would be in U.S. dollars,82 the 
Regulation does not discuss a number of factors important to making such a 
determination, such as which items should be excluded or included in the 
definition of a U.S. “asset” or the status of assets acquired to artificially in-
crease U.S. assets.  
Step two, “determining liabilities,” provides more direction to branches 
making the determination than the first step but leaves several key areas 
ambiguous.  The Regulation determines liabilities by multiplying the asset 
value from the first step by one of two ratios: a fixed ratio or the actual ra-
tio.83  For banks, the fixed ratio of assets to liabilities is 5%; for all other 
businesses, 50%.84  The Regulation gives banks the option of choosing to 
use its actual ratio or the default one.85  If a branch opts to use the actual ra-
tio method, that branch would determine the average total amount of corpo-
rate worldwide liabilities and the average total value of corporate 
worldwide assets.86  When a bank branch is considered undercapitalized like 
NatWest’s U.S. branches,87 that branch will have a very low ratio for tax 
purposes.  As a result, the branch will have very little “capital” for which it 
owes tax.  The Regulation offers little guidance on essential factors, such as 
which country’s tax principles would control the determination, which 
items would be classified as liabilities or assets, and how a branch should 
properly classify its interbranch transactions. 
Finally, under step three, the Treasury allows for an interest deduc-
tion.88  A taxpayer makes this calculation under either the “branch 
 
78  Id. § 1.882-5(a)(5). 
79  Id. § 1.882-5(a). 
80  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
81  § 1.882-5(b)(1). 
82  Id.  
83  Id. § 1.882-5(b)(2). 
84  See id. § 1.882-5(b)(2)(i).   
85  See id. § 1.882-5(b)(2).   
86  Id. § 1.882-5(b)(2)(ii). 
87  See infra Part II (discussing the NatWest litigation and the IRS’s claims that the branches were 
undercapitalized). 
88  § 1.882-5(b)(3). 
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book/dollar pool method” or the “separate currency pools method”;89 the 
IRS applied the “branch book/dollar pool method” to NatWest’s books.90   
II. THE NATWEST LITIGATION 
NatWest is based in the United Kingdom and engages in “a wide range 
of banking, financial and related activities throughout the world.”91  NatW-
est has 3600 branches worldwide.92  Six of these permanently established 
bank branches were within the United States during the years at issue in the 
NatWest litigation.93  In addition to these branches, NatWest also main-
tained a subsidiary within the United States, called National Westminster 
Bank U.S.A.94 
The U.S. branches received the funds necessary to conduct their busi-
ness by borrowing from either NatWest’s head office in the U.K. or other 
NatWest branches.95  The U.S. branches were also able to borrow from oth-
er banks and lending institutions.96  With these borrowed funds, the U.S. 
branches lent money to customers and occasionally to other NatWest 
branches, thereby generating interest income.97   
The IRS stopped treating this shifting of funds as interbranch lending 
for tax purposes when NatWest’s U.S. branches sent large sums of money 
to branches in Hong Kong, where tax rates were significantly lower than 
those in the United States.98  At the same time, NatWest began to deduct the 
interest expense on these “loans.”99  Because the IRS taxed all PEs under 
the Regulation, the IRS would have assessed a tax based on the amount of 
actual capital held by each branch.100  Consequently, the IRS would not 
have been able to make an accurate tax determination if a branch shifted its 
funds to another jurisdiction and left little to no capital on the books.  Be-
cause NatWest’s branches could remove these “loans” from their books by 
shifting the funds to Hong Kong, the capital amounts on the books were ex-
tremely low—the NatWest courts put the amounts consistently below 
 
89  Id. § 1.882-5(b)(3)(i)–(ii). 
90  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
91  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121 (1999). 
92  About Us, NATWEST, http://www.natwest.com/global/about-us.ashx (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
93  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495 (2003).  The six branches were the New York branch; the 
Nassau, Bahamas branch; the Cayman Islands branch; the International Banking Facility (IBF) branch; 
the Chicago branch; and the San Francisco branch.  Id.  The New York branch operated the IBF, Nassau, 
and Cayman Islands branches.  Id. at 495 n.7. 
94  Id. at 495. 
95  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 121. 
96  Id.  
97  Id. 
98  The corporate tax rate in Hong Kong, for example, is currently 16.5%.  See INLAND REVENUE 
DEP’T TAX GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
99  Johnston, supra note 2. 
100  For a description of the taxing structure under this version of the Regulation, see supra Part I.D. 
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1.75% of total assets.101  If the IRS were to rely strictly on the NatWest 
branches’ books, the branches’ taxable income would not reflect the eco-
nomic reality: these “loans” to Hong Kong were merely a shift in capital to 
reduce their tax burden.  
U.S. branches of foreign banks are not required by regulation to main-
tain any minimum amount of capital.  Yet the capital that a branch actually 
requires to finance its day-to-day operations is part of the IRS’s determina-
tion of what taxes that branch owes.  Over the years in question, NatWest’s 
books had designated capital ratios for U.S. branches ranging from 0.76% 
to 1.75%.102  These amounts are much lower than the capital required to ac-
tually operate a PE.  By comparison, NatWest’s U.S. subsidiary, which was 
required to follow SEC regulations, consistently had on its books a capital 
ratio of between 6.03% and 7.19%.103  
After the IRS audited NatWest, it increased the branches’ taxable in-
come by approximately $155 million for the seven-year period from 1981 
to 1987.104  NatWest faced an additional tax liability of more than $65 mil-
lion—though corresponding U.K. tax credits covered some of this in-
crease.105  The IRS reached this amount by applying the articulated three-
step formula of the Regulation to reformulate NatWest’s proper interest ex-
pense deduction.  Under this approach, which will be discussed in greater 
detail below, the IRS calculated NatWest’s capital ratio based on the bank’s 
worldwide liabilities and assets, thus allowing the U.S. branches’ proper in-
terest deduction to include the profits NatWest shifted and exclude interest 
on the “loans” from the branches’ home office and Hong Kong branches.106 
Subsequently, in 1996, NatWest sued the U.S. government, claiming it 
overpaid its taxes and was entitled to a refund.  Its argument, which the 
NatWest I and NatWest II courts and the Federal Circuit accepted, was that  
the Regulation, adopted in 1980 and enacted in 1981, was inconsistent with 
the preexisting 1975 U.S.–U.K. Treaty.107  Both the NatWest I and NatWest 
II decisions, which were affirmed by the Federal Circuit, precluded the IRS 
from using a necessary tool in its arsenal to fight tax avoidance.   
The central problem with the NatWest courts’ interpretation is that it 
treats NatWest’s interbranch transactions as done at arm’s length.  To cha-
racterize any of these interbranch transactions as reflecting arm’s length 
terms and pricing is an economically untenable position.  A NatWest 
branch would very likely provide a lower interest rate to its sister branches 
than it would to a branch of a different bank especially because NatWest’s 
 
101  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495 (2003). 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
105  Id. at 1349.  The U.K. tax credits did not cover $37 million of this tax increase.  Id. at 1350. 
106  See id. at 1351 (discussing the application of Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980)). 
107  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121–22 (1999).   
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head office maintained all of the U.S. branches’ capital.  Typical creditor 
concerns, which lead to higher interest rates, would not exist. 
A. NatWest I Litigation 
The NatWest I court held that the three-step formula of the Regulation, 
which the IRS employed to make a worldwide determination of NatWest’s 
assets and liabilities, was inconsistent with the “separate enterprise” provi-
sions of Article 7 of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.108  Analyzing the text of the 
U.S.–U.K. Treaty, the court determined that Article 7 treats U.S. branches 
as independent, separate entities.109  According to the court’s analysis, these 
independent entities deal at arm’s length with other units of NatWest “as if 
they were wholly unrelated” except that the branches could deduct a rea-
sonable allocation of home office expense.110  While the court noted that 
commentaries and reports contemporaneous with the signing of the U.S.–
U.K. treaty generally supported its interpretation,111 it did not even mention 
the subsequent commentary on the attribution of profits to PEs.  Other 
NatWest courts noted that subsequent commentary supported the IRS’s po-
sition but rejected the commentary as not reflective of the signatory parties’ 
understanding.112  But what if the signatory parties understood that the 
OECD would release future commentary to address issues that it could not 
have anticipated in 1963? 
Turning to the 1963 OECD Commentary on Article 7, the court found 
that “where the books of account of a permanent establishment are, with ad-
justments, adequate to determine the profits . . . of the permanent estab-
lishment as a separate entity, then those books should be used (and 
presumably not some substituted formula).”113  The court quotes language 
that it treats as dispositive: “[I]t is always necessary to start with the real 
facts of the situation as they appear from the business records . . . .”114  The 
very language—to “start” with the business records—implies that, where 
the business records do not provide the facts as they truly exist, a proper 
analysis must turn to external facts.  And to gauge NatWest’s actual situa-
tion, the IRS had turned to the three-step formula of the Regulation, an ap-
proach the NatWest courts rejected. 
The court turned to further language in the commentary on Article 7 
about adjustments made to reflect arm’s length transactions.115  After sifting 
 
108  Id. at 121. 
109  Id. at 123–24. 
110  Id. at 124. 
111  Id. 
112  See, e.g., NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 502–03 (2003) (rejecting the 2003 commentary supporting 
the IRS’s position as not reflective of the signatory parties’ understanding). 
113  NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 126. 
114  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82). 
115  Id. at 126–27.   
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through a plethora of commentary discussing the need to adjust the 
branches’ books to reflect these types of transactions, the court did not offer 
any help in formulating the best means for the IRS to make such an adjust-
ment.  The IRS would have to make some sort of adjustment; NatWest’s in-
terbranch transactions were clearly not done at arm’s length.  The court may 
have remained silent because it recognized that, although the formula used 
in the NatWest audit was inappropriate, the IRS would inevitably need to 
use some type of formula to determine adjustments to reflect arm’s length 
transactions.  Because the court’s opinion criticized the application of the 
IRS’s proposed formula, however, the court could not very well impose one 
itself especially because it lacks the IRS’s expertise in this area.   
Finally, the court laid out its reasons for finding the Regulation incon-
sistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.  First, the Regulation’s computation of 
the interest expense deduction “disregard[ed] all interbranch transactions, 
even for banking operations.”116  Because the Treaty required each branch 
be treated as an independent and separate entity, the NatWest I court rea-
soned that all transactions, including interbranch ones, must be used in the 
calculation of assets and liabilities.117  At the same time, however, Nat-
West’s interbranch transactions were hardly those that would be made by an 
independent entity: independent entities would not shift profits to another 
company as a repayment of a “loan” they never received.  Second, the IRS 
computed the Regulation’s second and third steps “on the basis of world-
wide assets and worldwide liabilities of the entire foreign enterprise, rather 
than determining the interest deduction on the basis of the separate, inde-
pendent operations” of the branches.118  Again, the NatWest I court refused 
to allow the IRS to avoid the independent and separate aspect of the Ar-
ticle 7 language even though NatWest’s shifting of funds between branches 
bore no resemblance to the actions of actual independent entities. 
B. NatWest II Litigation 
After its defeat in NatWest I, the IRS searched for a new way to avoid 
refunding the taxes paid by the NatWest branches.  The IRS’s revised ap-
proach to attributing profits to the NatWest branches was the “corporate 
yardstick” method.  Under this method, the IRS would have applied the 
capital ratio that a branch would have if it were independently incorpo-
rated.119  Again, knowing that NatWest’s interbranch “loans” hardly consti-
tuted transactions that would occur between two actual independent parties, 
the IRS looked for a way to adjust NatWest’s U.S. income.  The IRS relied 
on the “separate and distinct” language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty,120 finding 
 
116  Id. at 130. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. (emphasis added). 
119  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495–96 (2003). 
120  Id.  The relevant language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty reads:  
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that the treaty allowed it to attribute to a branch “the amount of capital that 
a separately-incorporated bank of the same size as the branch would likely 
hold.”121  Relying on an expert report, the IRS proposed a capital ratio of as-
sets to liabilities of between 6% and 7%.122  The calculated corporate 
yardstick capital ratio was far closer to the amount NatWest allocated to its 
U.S. subsidiary than the paltry 0.76% ratio it claimed for its U.S. branches.  
In the IRS’s opinion, the new ratio also better reflected the treaty language 
that says such an enterprise is treated as “dealing wholly independently” 
with its home office and other branches, at least for tax purposes.123 
Yet the NatWest II court still found that this method violated the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty.  It determined that the plain meaning of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty 
did not permit the government to impute capital to a branch.124  Rejecting 
the IRS’s approach, the court determined that “separate and distinct” means 
“separate and distinct from the rest of the bank of which it is a part”125 and 
thus determined that Article 7 only allowed the IRS “to adjust the books 
and records of the branch to ensure that transactions between the branch and 
other portions of the foreign bank [we]re properly identified and characte-
rized for tax purposes.”126  Using the branch books as the starting point, the 
NatWest II court found that imputing such capital went beyond the scope of 
the adjustments the U.S.–U.K. Treaty allowed.127  Adjustments were per-
missible to ensure that interest payments reflected an arm’s length relation-
ship—which, in NatWest’s case, did not actually exist.  Yet the court 
rejected the IRS’s reliance on “‘hypothetical’ infusions of capital” to adjust 
the NatWest branches’ capital ratios, finding such adjustments impermissi-
ble under the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.128   
C. NatWest IV Federal Circuit Litigation 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered arguments for 
and against all three lower court NatWest decisions.129  It addressed the 
same concerns discussed in the lower courts: the taxation of interest ex-
pense on intracorporate loans and the allocation of capital to the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
[T]here shall . . . be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be 
expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the 
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment. 
U.S.–U.K Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(2) (emphasis added). 
121  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 497. 
122  Id. at 495–96. 
123  Id. at 495.  
124  Id. at 497.   
125  Id.   
126  Id. at 497–98. 
127  Id.  
128  Id. at 498. 
129  NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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branches.130  The government appealed the rulings of all three NatWest deci-
sions, arguing that not only was the IRS’s determination based on Nat-
West’s worldwide liabilities and assets under the Regulation consistent with 
the U.S.–U.K. Treaty but also that the proposed corporate yardstick method 
of NatWest II conformed with the treaty’s language.131   
The appellate court began by affirming the NatWest I decision.132  First, 
the court outlined what it considered to be the relevant commentary to Ar-
ticle 7 of the OECD Model Treaty.  Because both the United States and the 
United Kingdom would have relied on the 1963 OECD Commentary at the 
time in which they entered into the Treaty, the court found this understand-
ing to be the proper means of guidance for the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.133  Ana-
lyzing the treaty according to this Commentary, the court ultimately agreed 
with NatWest’s argument that the three-step formula of Regulation 1.882-5 
was inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.134  Like the Court of Federal 
Claims in NatWest I, the Federal Circuit disregarded as irrelevant any 
commentary on the attribution of profits to PEs issued subsequent to the 
signing of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty in 1975 even though the IRS regulation in 
question was not enacted until 1981.  Because the post-1975 commentary 
did not exist at the time the two nations entered into the Treaty, the court 
did not consider it relevant.135 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the NatWest II decision, rejecting 
the government’s efforts to apply the corporate yardstick method to impute 
capital to NatWest’s U.S. branches.136  The court agreed with NatWest’s in-
terpretation of Article 7(2) of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty, which focused on the 
Article’s “same or similar conditions” language.137  The government tried to 
emphasize the Article’s “dealing wholly independently with” phrase.138  The 
IRS’s approach refused to treat the interbranch transactions as the U.S. 
branches dealing wholly independently with their home office and Hong 
Kong sister branches.139   
 
130  See id. at 1351. 
131  Id. at 1353.  The IRS raised a third argument on appeal concerning discovery of the NatWest 
head office’s books, id., but this argument was not addressed in any lower court decision and will not be 
addressed here.  
132  Id. at 1359.   
133  Id. at 1358–59. 
134  Id. at 1359. 
135  Id. at 1358–59. 
136  Id. at 1362.   
137  Id. at 1360.   
138  Id.  The language of Article 7(2) reads as follows:  
[T]here shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits 
which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the 
same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently 
with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.   
U.S.–U.K Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(2).   
139  See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1360–61.   
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The court determined, however, that NatWest’s interpretation more ac-
curately comported with the treaty.  The “wholly independently” language, 
the court said, required that any interbranch transactions be “accurately cha-
racterized and reflect arm’s length terms and pricing.”140  It did not require 
that the U.S. branches be treated as if they were subject to SEC and market 
requirements.141  Yet without being able to impute capital to NatWest or 
look to NatWest’s worldwide income, how could the IRS possibly make ad-
justments to accurately characterize the transactions?  The Federal Circuit 
did not say.  Recent OECD commentary, though, does, and the corporate 
yardstick is just such a means. 
III. LOOKING TO THE COMMENTARY IN ITS ENTIRETY 
The OECD frequently releases new discussion drafts and commen-
tary.142  It develops these documents to assist countries in their interpretation 
of the Model Treaty as new and previously unforeseeable conflicts arise.143  
In 2008, for example, the OECD released a discussion draft of a new Ar-
ticle 7 to its Model Treaty.144  Then, in July 2010, the OECD released the fi-
nal language of the new Article 7 of the Model Treaty.145  As countries like 
the United States continue to rely on the Model Treaty language when craft-
ing their own double taxation treaties,146 it is important to note that the 
OECD continues to publish new guidance to assist in the interpretation of 
such treaties.  Section A of this Part notes that the drafters very much in-
tended for those relying on the Model Treaty to apply any commentary that 
became available to address certain unforeseen issues.  Section B argues 
 
140  Id. 
141  Id.  
142  A quick survey of the available documents on the OECD’s website shows that in 2008 alone the 
OECD released the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital - Articles 7, 11, 24, 25, and 26; 
the report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments; a discussion draft on a New Article 7 
(Business Profits) of the OECD Model Treaty Convention; and a discussion draft on the Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings. 
143  The new Article 7, for example, attempts to incorporate into its language the different problems 
and solutions the OECD addressed in its Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments.  See OECD Approves Updates to Model Tax Convention, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
and Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV. (July 22, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_37989746_45689428_1_1_1_
1,00.html. 
144  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON A NEW ARTICLE 7 (BUSINESS 
PROFITS) OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
37/8/40974117.pdf. 
145  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE 2010 UPDATE TO THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/43/45689328.pdf. 
146  See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-14 
(updating the U.S.–Japan Treaty in compliance with the Model Treaty’s language). 
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that uniformity among countries benefits not only the OECD but also the 
economy in general. 
A. Interpretive Methodology: Shared Expectations 
The NatWest courts, citing to the “Contracting State” language of the 
U.S.–U.K. Treaty, used a theory of contract interpretation and therefore on-
ly gave strong deference to commentary available in 1975.147  Its interpre-
tive methodology is inherently flawed because treaties like that at issue in 
the NatWest litigation are unique in that they evolve.  The Model Treaty 
and the subsequent treaties adopting its language are not one-off treaties 
like declarations of peace between warring nations.  The Model Treaty is an 
evolving document,148 and the OECD releases subsequent commentary and 
drafts precisely to address unforeseen issues.  As the Model Treaty evolves, 
the United States will likely base future treaty language on the most recent 
version.  U.S. courts should at least consider all OECD commentary rele-
vant to the issue before them because the OECD’s continual release of up-
dated commentary is part of the treaty countries’ “shared expectations.”   
Interpreting the Model Treaty by using only “the understanding of the 
1975 Treaty partners,”149 the NatWest courts ignored years of subsequent 
answers to problems and situations that OECD member nations encountered 
and wanted addressed.  The decision of NatWest II court, unlike other deci-
sions made by that court, acknowledged the existence of the OECD’s 
evolving views.150  The rejection of these arguments as diverging from the 
“genuine shared expectations”151 of the United States and the United King-
dom misinterprets the countries’ shared expectations.  Both are member na-
tions of the OECD.152  Article 3 of the OECD Convention, which both the 
United States and the United Kingdom ratified, states that member nations 
 
147  See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
148  See 2008 MODEL TREATY, supra note 65, at 8 (“The Fiscal Committee of the OECD had 
envisaged, when presenting its Report in 1963, that the Draft Convention might be revised at a later 
stage following further study.  Such a revision was also needed to take account of the experience gained 
by Member countries in the negotiation and practical application of bilateral conventions, of changes in 
the tax systems of Member countries, of the increase in international fiscal relations, and of the 
development of new sectors of business activity and the emergence of new complex business 
organisations at the international level.”). 
149  NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 503 (2003). 
150  See id. at 499–503 (discussing the 1984 Report on the Taxation of Multinational Banking 
Enterprises, the 2001 Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, and 
the 2003 Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments: Part II (Banks)).  
The court ultimately rejected the use of any of this subsequent commentary, though, because it did not 
reflect the “genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties.”  Id. at 502 (quoting Maximov v. 
United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
151 Id. at 502 (quoting Maximov, 299 F.2d at 568).  
152  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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will “consult together on a continuing basis,”153 conducting studies and ad-
dressing issues as they arise.154  When the two countries adopted the treaty, 
both were fully aware of the OECD’s operations and its commentaries and 
discussion drafts.  It seems a stretch to say that the United States and the 
United Kingdom did not expect that the OECD would continue to release 
commentary to address new problems as they arose. 
B. In Violation of OECD Principles 
Favorable tax treatment for certain nations violates several principles 
of the OECD.  As noted above, the United States plays host to over $4.5 
trillion in foreign-related bank assets.155  Banking is a volatile industry, and 
attracting new business is essential.156  For these reasons, among others, the 
United States has entered into several new treaties on the prevention of 
double taxation since 2000.157  As noted below, the OECD was well aware 
of the need for uniformity in fiscal policies to prevent double taxation and 
foster cross-border businesses. 
1. OECD and Economic Development.—One of the OECD’s chief 
aims as stated in its own Convention was “that the economically more ad-
vanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the best of their ability the 
countries in process of economic development.”158  None of the countries 
that have formed a double taxation treaty with the United States since 2000 
are one of the more “economically advanced” nations that belongs to the 
OECD.159  The potential tax windfalls explained above would fall strictly on 
banks with a parent office in member countries because those countries 
adopted and ratified treaties well in advance of nonmember nations.  Al-
though U.K. banks could shift capital to other countries to dodge taxes—at 
least until the United States and United Kingdom ratified an updated trea-
ty—countries with treaties ratified after the publication of the new commen-
tary could not gain such benefits.  Their tax assessment within the United 
States would be much higher because their U.S. PEs would be required to 
keep all U.S.-generated income on their books.  Because NatWest’s home 
office and Hong Kong branches received the U.S. PEs’ profits via “loan” 
 
153  Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development art. 3(b), Dec. 14, 
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 141 (emphasis added), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
7/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
154  See id. art. 3 (cross-referencing Article 2’s enumerated undertakings).   
155  CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 33, at 740. 
156  Id. 
157  See United States Income Tax Treaties—A to Z, supra note 17.  These countries include 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Sri Lanka.  Id.   
158  See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 
153, at pmbl. 
159  Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Sri Lanka are not currently members of the OECD.  See Members 
and Partners, supra note 58.   
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repayments, those PEs could reduce the income on their books even though 
the money stayed entirely within the control of NatWest.  The branches 
could also deduct the interest expense “paid” on these loans.  Banks without 
such an option would likely have to charge higher interest rates on loans or 
find some other means of making up the deficiencies in profits due to the 
worse tax treatment.   
This OECD principle is also found in the introduction to the Model 
Treaty:   
It has long been recognized among the Member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development that it is desirable to clarify, 
standardize, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are engaged in 
commercial, industrial, financial, or any other activities in other countries 
through the application by all countries of common solutions to identical cases 
of double taxation.160 
The introduction to the Model Treaty does not state that it is desirable for 
“all Member countries” to find common solutions to double taxation prob-
lems but rather “all countries.”  Yet the NatWest decisions would have the 
U.S. apply inconsistent solutions to different countries: U.K. banks can shift 
funds to allocate profits to PEs in jurisdictions with more desirable tax 
rates, but countries like Sri Lanka do not have such options.   
2. OECD and Economic Uniformity.—The NatWest courts placed the 
IRS in a difficult situation.  All future treaties relying on the Model Treaty 
will likely employ the language of the recently released discussion draft on 
Article 7.161  Under these future treaties, the IRS could apply the corporate 
yardstick approach and the NatWest courts’ methodology would find it ac-
ceptable.162  This interpretation gives a distinct business advantage to bank 
branches whose parent resides in a country with a preexisting tax treaty 
with the United States.  Countries with weaker economies, which are un-
likely to have long-standing tax treaties with the United States, suffer under 
such an interpretation, making it harder for them to compete with banks of 
more developed nations.  Unless the United States starts rewriting tax trea-
ties every time the OECD issues new commentary, the IRS has little room 
to maneuver under the NatWest ruling. 
Because the United States relies on the Model Treaty language when 
formulating its own tax treaties with other nations, any treaties it now enters 
 
160  2008 MODEL TREATY, supra note 65, at 7 (emphasis added). 
161  The OECD issued the Discussion Draft of Article 7 in July of 2008, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., supra note 144, and finalized and formally incorporated the new language into its 
Model Treaty.  See Mary Bennett & Raffaele Russo, Discussion Draft on a New Art. 7 of the OECD 
Model Convention, 2009 INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J. 73, 73–80.   
162  See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the recent OECD commentary as it relates to the 
corporate yardstick method. 
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into will very likely incorporate the new language of Article 7.163  As a re-
sult, some U.S. treaties will embody the new language whereas others will 
predate it.  If new signatory countries must adhere to this new language but 
others are free to ignore it, then inconsistency will enter the banking mar-
ketplace.   
For example, imagine that the United States enters into a tax treaty 
with Bhutan based on the Model Treaty next week.  As a result, Bhutanese 
PEs within the United States would be required to comply with the new Ar-
ticle 7 language, and under the logic of the NatWest decisions,164 the nations 
would implicitly have relied on the recent commentary approving the cor-
porate yardstick method.  The IRS could attribute hypothetical capital to the 
Bhutanese PE under the corporate yardstick method, thus precluding the PE 
from shifting its income to foreign branches to dodge the U.S. tax rates.  
However, under the NatWest decisions, PEs with home offices in countries 
like Japan could amend their prior tax returns and ignore the new Article 7 
language and any recent commentary.165  A Japanese bank could shift funds 
from its U.S. PEs to its PEs in countries like Hong Kong, where the corpo-
rate tax rates are much lower, by having its Hong Kong branches “loan” the 
money and the U.S. branches “repay” the loans—deducting the interest ex-
pense to boot.  Bhutanese PEs in the above hypothetical would not have 
such an option.  The United States would prefer that Bhutanese PEs not 
have that option, but it does give greater advantage to countries with 
stronger economies because those are the countries that created the 
OECD.166  Application of the approach taken by the NatWest courts would 
thus create dramatically different tax consequences for two different banks 
competing in the same economic environment.  Further, the United States 
could conceivably lose billions of dollars in tax revenue because a bank 
with a PE in a country with lower corporate tax rates would have an incen-
tive to shift funds away from its U.S. PE even if only for accounting, rather 
than operational, purposes. 
 
163  The new Article 7 slightly alters the first two paragraphs of the old Article 7 and completely 
eliminates paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Compare MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: 
CONDENSED VERSION 27–28, art. 7 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 2010), with MODEL TREATY, 
supra note 14, at 46–46, art. 7.  
164  See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 503 (2003) (rejecting the use of later commentary as not 
reflective of the signatory parties’ understanding in 1975). 
165  Japan and the United States entered into a new treaty in November 2003, which the Senate rati-
fied in March 2004.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, supra note 146.  Although the new treaty will prevent future 
shifting of funds such as that in the NatWest situation, it does not stop banks from amending prior tax 
returns to do what NatWest did.  Further, any future issues that might arise could only be addressed by 
new commentary, none of which would relevant to the earlier understanding of the signatory parties 
under the NatWest decisions.   
166  Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 153, 
at pmbl. (referring to member nations as “the economically more advanced nations”).   
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IV. THE CORPORATE YARDSTICK METHOD 
By restricting their focus to the 1963 OECD Commentary and then 
looking solely at the commentary on Article 7, the NatWest courts ignored 
myriad subsequent commentary supplementing the original Model Treaty.  
When courts rely on OECD commentary, they should interpret the com-
mentary more consistently.  The NatWest methodology would encourage 
inconsistency, however, by applying different rules to banks from different 
countries, depending on the date of the treaty.  This Part explains both the 
need for and logic behind looking to subsequent commentary because this 
was indeed part of the shared expectations of parties entering into a double 
taxation treaty.  It then argues for a specific approach: the corporate 
yardstick. 
The corporate yardstick approach, which would have the IRS look to 
similarly situated bank branches to determine the meaning of “arm’s 
length,” is a method the OECD has found to more accurately assess the at-
tribution of profits, as expressed in the commentary.167  Because a bank 
dealing with its own branch does not offer the same interest rate that it 
would to an actually independent party, the corporate yardstick approach at-
tempts to replicate what an independent transaction would resemble.  Al-
though the corporate yardstick approach has its flaws, it is a far more 
economically realistic means of handling the attribution of profits to PEs 
than relying on a bank branch to honestly report the amount of capital it ac-
tually requires. 
Had the NatWest courts looked to the commentary that followed the 
1975 ratification of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty, they would have realized that the 
OECD had addressed and resolved this specific problem.  The OECD had 
not only addressed the issue of attribution of profits but had also endorsed 
the corporate yardstick approach. 
A. Recent OECD Commentary: An Evolving View 
Following its release of the Model Treaty in 1963, the OECD pub-
lished commentary to assist and guide nations that relied on the Model 
Treaty when drafting their own treaties on the avoidance of double taxation.  
The OECD often revises and updates such commentary, or even releases 
entirely new commentary when an unanticipated situation confronts a num-
ber of member nations.168  After releasing a discussion draft, the OECD ac-
 
167  See MODEL TREATY REPORT, supra note 14, at 82–83, art. 7, cmts. 11–12.. 
168  See Centre for Tax Policy and Administration: Publications & Documents, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,3770,en_2649_34897_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2011).  This website maintains numerous OECD reports, guidelines, 
commentaries, news releases, and other publications. 
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cepts suggestions and comments from member nations before drafting and 
issuing the final version of the commentary.169   
The 2007 commentary on Article 7 begins by noting that Article 7 is 
“not particularly detailed” and does not contain any “precise rules” for im-
plementing its general directive, thus allowing a variety of permissible me-
thods to implement the separate-enterprise approach.170  In 2004, the 
OECD’s discussion draft emphasized the total lack of “a consensus 
amongst Member countries as to the correct interpretation of Article 7.”171  
It also noted the “considerable variation in the domestic laws” of the vari-
ous member countries as to the proper means of taxing PEs.172  The Interna-
tional Fiscal Association (IFA), which each year chooses a monetary topic 
at loggerheads in the international community, chose the attribution of prof-
its to PEs for its 2006 convention.173  After receiving branch reports from 
members on the status of the topic in their respective countries, the IFA re-
porters concluded that “there is hardly a single point, be it in the application 
of domestic law or in the interpretation of article 7, on which every branch 
report agrees.”174   
The OECD revisited these issues in 2001, 2003, and 2007.  Although it 
still found no consensus among member nations on how best to attribute 
profits to a PE, the OECD offered three possible methods for attributing 
hypothetical capital to a branch that would satisfy Article 7’s separate-
enterprise principle: the “capital allocation” approach, the “quasi-thin capi-
talization” approach, and the “thin capitalization” approach. 
The capital allocation approach “allocate[s] the bank’s actual ‘free’ 
capital . . . in accordance with the attribution of financial assets and risks,” 
thus leading to an attribution of capital to a PE.175  Under the quasi-thin cap-
italization approach, a PE is attributed at least the same amount of “free” 
capital as would be “required for regulatory purposes . . . [for] an indepen-
dent banking enterprise operating in the host country.”176  This approach 
 
169  See, e.g., Discussion Draft Release of a New Article 7 (Business Profits) of Its Model Tax 
Convention (Revised), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,
3343,en_2649_33747_44117467_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).   
170  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVISED COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 7 OF THE 
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 3 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/2/
38361711.pdf (discussion draft). 
171  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 
TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT—PART I (GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS) 6 (2004), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/51/33637685.pdf. 
172  Id. at 4. 
173  See Philip Baker & Richard S. Collier, General Report, 91b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL 
INTERNATIONAL (2006). 
174  Id. at 34. 
175  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 
TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS (PES): PART II (BANKS) 23 (2003) (emphasis omitted), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/48/2497776.pdf.  
176  Id. at 24.   
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would require attributing to a PE the amount of capital required already as a 
pledge of assets—in the case of the United States, a 5% ratio.177  Finally, the 
OECD discussed the thin capitalization approach, under which a PE has at-
tributed to it “the same amount of ‘free’ capital as would independent bank-
ing enterprises carrying on the same or similar activities under the same or 
similar conditions in the jurisdiction of the PE.”178  In other words, a deter-
mination would consider how much capital an independent PE would re-
quire to operate.  The thin capitalization approach is the corporate yardstick 
approach by another name—the same approach the NatWest courts rejected. 
Noting that each of the three proposals had its strengths and weak-
nesses, the OECD determined that each was permissible under Article 7(2) 
of the Model Treaty.179  All three proposals support the idea that a bank’s 
capital should be attributed to its PE by reference to the risks arising from 
the PE’s activity.180  None of the approaches looks solely at the branch’s 
books to make the determination.  Under this more recent commentary, the 
IRS would certainly be able to increase NatWest’s taxable income by ad-
justing its interest expense deduction.  Both the OECD’s worldwide deter-
mination in NatWest I as well as the Regulation and the IRS’s corporate 
yardstick approach in NatWest II conform to the OECD’s evolving views.   
In 2008, the OECD formalized the discussion draft as a Report on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Part II of which ad-
dressed attributing profits to banks.  The report observed a “consensus 
amongst governments and business on the principle that a bank 
PE . . . should have sufficient capital to support” its operations.181  The re-
port then listed the “authorized approaches” for attributing that capital to a 
PE: specifically, the “capital allocation” and “thin capitalization” approach-
es.182  It still considered the “quasi-thin capitalization” approach to be ac-
ceptable but only as an alternative safe harbor.183 
The NatWest appellate court did not once mention the vast amount of 
commentary released subsequent to the 1975 signing of the U.S.–U.K. 
Treaty.  Yet it is clear from the various subsequent Commentaries and 
Drafts that interpreting Article 7 to allow for a corporate yardstick approach 
is not inconsistent with the language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.   
 
177  Pledge of Assets, 12 C.F.R. § 347.209 (2011). 
178  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 175, at 25. 
179  Id. at 27. 
180  See id. at 20. 
181  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO 
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS 103 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/36/41031455.
pdf. 
182  Id. at 96–97. 
183  Id. at 98. 
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B. Hypothesizing Assets and Risks 
Having lost the litigation battle, the IRS and the Treasury Department 
needed to determine an acceptable way to both comply with the U.S.–U.K. 
Treaty, as the courts understood it, and properly tax PEs.  When the Trea-
sury Department released Treasury Decision 9465 in September of 2009, it 
failed to solve any of the problems resulting from the NatWest litigation.  
Treasury Decision 9465 amended Regulation 1.882-5, rejected in the 
NatWest decisions as inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.184  But the un-
derlying factors making the Regulation incompatible with the U.S.–U.K. 
Treaty are still present in the Regulation.  Although the Treasury altered 
some of the Regulation’s language, the Treasury did not remove or signifi-
cantly change parts of the Regulation that involve the determination of 
worldwide assets and liabilities. 
The Regulation retains the complicated formula for allocating interest 
based on a company’s worldwide assets, one of the factors explicitly re-
jected by the NatWest I court.185  Although the Treasury did make minor ad-
justments to the method of determination, the actual ratio computation 
remained the company’s total worldwide liabilities divided by the total val-
ue of its worldwide assets.186  When amending the Regulation, the Treasury 
addressed this aspect but did not resolve the issue.  Rather, the Treasury 
amended the Regulation to return to the fixed-ratio amount, which a branch 
can opt for instead of using its actual ratio, to 95%.187  By decreasing the ra-
tio amount and allowing companies to claim only 5% capital, the Treasury 
provided an incentive for some companies to choose the fixed amount.  A 
7% capital ratio is higher than a branch is likely to have, given that it does 
not require actual capitalization.188  Five percent, though still high, makes 
the default option more attractive.  However, banks like NatWest, whose 
branches span the globe, will not choose any fixed ratio amount if they can 
shift funds to locations in more favorable tax jurisdictions.189 
 
184  T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542. 
185  Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(2)(i) (as amended by T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542). 
186  Id.  In the three-part formula to determine the interest expense deduction, the Treasury increased 
the fixed ratio amount allowed for banks in the second step.  Id. t § 1.882-5(c)(4).    
187  T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542, at 546.  The Treasury changed the original amount of 95% to 
93% in 2006.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(4) (2006). 
188  NatWest’s branches, for example, had a ratio of between 0.76% and 1.75% (although this ratio is 
much lower than the required pledge of assets for a branch).  See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495 
(2003).  By contrast, NatWest’s U.S. subsidiary, subject to capitalization requirements, regularly had a 
capital ratio from 6.03% to 7.19%.  Id. 
189  For example, consider NatWest’s operations.  Between 1981 and 1987, the amount of capital on 
its U.S. branches’ books ranged from 0.76% to 1.75%.  Id.  Thus, according to its books, NatWest’s 
liabilities to assets ratio is anywhere from 98.25% to 99.24%.  This is far more favorable to NatWest 
than a fixed ratio of 95% (or 96%, 97%, or even 98%) would be.  When a company can shift funds to 
avoid claiming capital at a PE, it has every tax incentive to do so. 
105:1317  (2011) After NatWest: Double Taxation Treaty Interpretation 
 1345
The IRS and the Treasury probably did not alter the language of the 
Regulation because the NatWest courts rejected all of their other options.  
Rather, knowing that any subsequent treaties would incorporate the evolv-
ing views of the OECD, the Treasury probably kept the Regulation intact 
because it is acceptable under the more recent OECD commentary.  The 
NatWest II court rejected the corporate yardstick approach as an “evolving 
view[]” that “does not reflect the understanding of the 1975 Treaty part-
ners.”190  The plain language of the subsequent commentary makes clear 
that a corporate yardstick approach is perfectly acceptable under the Model 
Treaty.  To prevent companies from shifting funds that should be attributed 
to a U.S. PE to countries like Hong Kong, the IRS will likely employ this 
formula with any country whose treaty does not predate the most recent 
commentary.   
But why should banks based in countries with treaties predating certain 
commentary be given more favorable (or less favorable) tax treatment than 
those countries with treaties postdating such commentary?  If two different 
banks from two different countries are to compete in the same market, a 
treaty interpretation favoring one bank over another gives the favored bank 
an unwarranted economic advantage.  This is especially true when the lan-
guage of the countries’ respective treaties is identical.  The Regulation’s 
worldwide determination is only inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty to 
the extent that a court looks only to commentary available at the time of ra-
tification.   
C. Subsequent Commentary: Shared Expectations? 
The NatWest courts explicitly rejected the idea of relying on any of this 
subsequent commentary.191  It is beyond dispute that the information con-
tained in a discussion draft or subsequent commentary is itself a determina-
tion of the drafters.  The NatWest II court referred to the more recent 
discussion drafts as representing the “continued thinking of the OECD on 
attributing capital to branches and its post-1995 evolving views on arm’s 
length principles.”192  Under traditional treaty interpretation—or contract in-
terpretation, for that matter—only the commentary available at the time of 
treaty ratification should govern a court’s decision.  But as noted above,193 
although the Model Treaty’s drafters did not anticipate the specific issues 
and the resulting commentary, they certainly anticipated that problems 
would arise and that commentary would address them.  It is for this reason 
that, if courts are going to look to OECD commentary at all, they should 
look to it in its entirety. 
 
190  Id. at 503. 
191  Id. at 501 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the 2001 Discussion Draft could not and does not 
reflect the understandings of the Treaty partners in 1975.”). 
192  Id. at 503. 
193  See supra Part IV.A.  
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CONCLUSION 
Global commerce has greatly evolved since 1975, when the United 
States and the United Kingdom signed their treaty on the avoidance of 
double taxation.  The NatWest courts placed both parties inside an econom-
ic bubble, strictly adhering to the language of the Model Treaty and com-
mentary available in 1975.  This decision ignored years of subsequent 
OECD studies and resolutions of problems unforeseeable in 1975.  Yet 
countries without tax treaties prior to the 1984, 2003, or 2007 commentaries 
and drafts would, upon entering into a tax treaty with the United States, face 
significantly different tax consequences than countries with treaties predat-
ing such issuances.  The result is economic inconsistency among banks, 
burdening those from countries whose economies the OECD vowed to help 
improve.  Future courts should look to the OECD commentary in its entire-
ty, if they intend to rely on it at all.  Courts should give the Model Treaty 
the very consistency it requires and provide contracting parties with a level 
economic playing field. 
 
 
